
Secularism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Turkey and Indonesia

Muhammad Fahmi Basyah Fauzi^{1*}, Muh. Asy'ari¹

¹*Department of International Relations, Universitas Bosowa, Indonesia*

**Correspondence: m.fahmi@universitasbosowa.ac.id*

Abstract

Turkey and Indonesia, while sharing similarities as Muslim-majority democracies with a presidential system, also exhibit distinct differences. Geographically, Indonesia is located in Southeast Asia, separating the Pacific and Indian Oceans, whereas Turkey serves as a bridge between Asia and Europe. Despite their differences, both countries practice secularism, with Turkey often cited as a successful example of a Muslim-majority state maintaining secular governance. Indonesia, despite its diverse ethnic and religious landscape, also upholds the separation of religion and politics. This paper will explore the practice of secularism in both Turkey and Indonesia, examining its historical background, relationship with democracy, and compatibility with Islam. The first part will cover the concept of secularism, while subsequent parts will focus on the implementation of secularism in Turkey and Indonesia, respectively.

Keywords: democracy, secularism, Muslim world, Indonesia, Turkey.

1. Introduction: Understanding Secularism

The concept of 'secularism' was first defined by George Holyoake in 1846. The ideas of a 'secular' society grew from establishing the British National Secular Society, which, at its peak in the 1880s, had a membership of some 6,000 people. Holyoake proposed that 'secularism' should refer to any social order that was separate from religion without engaging in any direct criticism of religious belief. In more detail, it involved the view that human life could be improved by purely secular means, that science can provide perfectly adequate guidance for this life, and that, ethically, the idea of doing good to others requires no religious foundations (Shiam Heng, 2010). Secularism, inspired by militant atheists such as Charles Bradlaugh, Member of Parliament for Northampton in Great Britain, assumed a more strident, uncompromising, and critical relationship to religious belief.

In Britain, organized atheism can be said to have come into existence with the establishment of the Secular Society in 1866 by Bradlaugh, its first president. Secularism became a public and political issue when Bradlaugh, elected to Parliament, refused to take the Oath of Allegiance, which required him to take his seat in the House. As a result, his constituency was declared vacant. The Oath was eventually abandoned in 1886 (Turner, 2011). However, it was Holyoake who built up the local groups that formed the backbone of the society.

Secularism has also been believed to mean limiting religion to the private domain, which is impossible because religion is different from unique clothes that we can set aside as soon as we leave home. Such eminent sociologists as Robert Bellah, Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, and José Casanova believe that the presence of religion in the public domain is valuable and desirable (Ganji, 2017). However, explaining and justifying any claim in the public domain must be done by resorting to reasoning, not religious texts and holy people.

1.1. Secularism as part of democracy

Secularism is generally defined as a system which separates religion and politics. It is without doubt that secularism was invented to unite people from different personal backgrounds to stand under the same flag. Before exploring secularism even further, it is essential to understand how secularism took

its importance in governance. The best way to determine the concept is by explaining secularism as part of democracy.

Democracy, derived from the Greek word *demos* (people), is a government with supreme power vested in the people. In some forms, democracy can be exercised directly by the people; in large societies, it is by the people through their elected agents. President Abraham Lincoln once defined democracy as the people's Government, by the people, and for the people.

Freedom and democracy are often interchangeable, but the two are not synonymous. Democracy is indeed a set of ideas and principles about freedom, but it also consists of practices and procedures that have been molded through a long and often tortuous history. Democracy is the institutionalization of freedom. In the end, people living in a democratic society must serve as the ultimate guardians of their liberty and must forge their path toward the ideals outlined in the preamble to the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world" (Hoffe, 2007).

Democracies rest upon the principle that Government exists to serve the people. In other words, the people are citizens of the democratic state, not its subjects. Because the state protects the rights of its citizens, in turn, the citizens will give the state their loyalty. By contrast, under an authoritarian system, the state demands loyalty and service from its people without any reciprocal obligation to secure their consent for its actions.

Secularism in a democracy demands that politicians and public servants leave their religious commitments at home, which fulfills two functions: it ensures that religion does not contaminate politics, so facilitating the peaceful interaction of varying belief systems or 'comprehensive doctrines' within the single community of the nation-state; and it protects personal religious and non-religious commitments from outside interference or ideological coercion. Only physical actions or 'hate' speech that influence others' fundamental rights fall under the remit of the law.

The separation between religion and politics may be made in two ways, speaking in terms of principles. On the one hand, there is the conception of the lay sector in society, guaranteed by the legal separation between church and state, as well as by the neutrality of the state and the principle of religious freedom. On the other hand, there is a sociological separation between religion and politics in the form of growing secularisation, meaning the withdrawal of daily life and thinking from religious domination (Lane, 2009).

Alfred Stepan emphasizes the importance of the "twin tolerations" between the state and religion for the development and consolidation of democracy (Stepan, 2000). "Twin tolerations" is more flexible than "separation of the state and religion." Democracies in different parts of the world have produced versions of the twin tolerations between the state and religion based on certain levels of mutual respect, differentiation, and autonomy. Some Muslim-majority countries (e.g., Senegal and Indonesia) seem more successful than others (e.g., Iran and Uzbekistan) in producing the twin tolerations convenient to democracy and their socio-political conditions.

1.2. Secularism as part of the modern world

Globalization has many dimensions in the twenty-first century. The challenges of global politics include the practice of governance and democracy in a world of diverse economic and social realities. As cultures meet, religions interact within core areas, along adjoining borders, and in far-flung diasporas (Wessels, 2009). The encounter between religion and globalization is a crucial feature of our world. In the study of politics, a new awareness of religion is evident.

As a consequence of globalization, modern societies are predominantly multicultural. Consequently, they are also multi-faith societies where the state increasingly intervenes to organize and regulate

religion through diverse policies. In every multicultural society, many typically large diasporic communities are held together less by the secular ties of citizenship than by a shared religious culture. Modernization increased cultural diversity in three ways (Bruce, 2009). People moved and brought their language, religion, and social values into a new setting. Second, the expansive nation-state encompassed new peoples. Third, especially common in Protestant settings, economic modernization created classes that created competing sects. Hence the paradox: at the same time as the nation-state was trying to make a unified national culture out of thousands of small communities, it had to come to terms with increasing religious diversity. The solution was an increasingly neutral state. State-established churches were abandoned (the United States) or neutered (the British case). While freedom from entanglements with secular power allowed churches to become more clearly spiritual, their removal from the center of public life reduced contact with the general population.

In the modern world, religion and nationalism have often functioned as modes of individual and collective identity in a global political context. Both religious and nationalist modes of self-reference are products of a standard process of modernization, of which globalization can be regarded as the current phase (Turner, 2011). Just as nationalism can assume either liberal or reactionary forms, religion can adopt either an ecumenical/cosmopolitan or a fundamentalist orientation. From the late nineteenth century, citizenship became increasingly the dominant juridical framework of civil society as the mode of national membership and individual identity. In Europe and North America, national citizenship emerged as a secular form of solidarity that competed or combined with the church to provide a potent channel of nationalist identity and fervor.

However, modernization also brings threats to peaceful and secular communities. Sullivan assumes that the phenomena of far-right extremism and Islamophobia can be identified as anti-secularism ideas (Sullivan, 2017). The critical assumption is that far-right extremism like ISIS's barbarically primitive xenophobia makes any notion of religious diversity absurd. The situation leads to a lack of empathy and sociologically accumulates hatred toward certain religious beliefs.

1.3. Secularism in the Muslim world

1.3.1 Understanding the Muslim World

The Muslim world harbors more than a billion people adhering to the religion of Mohammed and regarding the Koran as The Book containing their basic guidelines in life. It consists of the Arab civilization and the vast Muslim countries outside of it, such as Iran, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Furthermore, there is the religiously neutral state of Turkey with its Muslims, as well as the Turkic-speaking populations in the former U.S.S.R. (Khanates and Caucasia) and the people of Kurdistan. Finally, it comprises sizeable Muslim populations in several African countries, such as Senegal, Mali, and Guinea, including religiously divided societies like those in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Kenya, as well as that in India, and considerable Muslim minorities in many other countries, including Western Europe, such as those in France and Germany.

The Muslim world is as significant in population as the Christian world but far less developed. It is bigger than the Buddhist world but is less dense to be again. Whatever measures one applies concerning modernity or postmodernity, the Muslim world scores lower than other civilizations, including affluence and human rights indicators. The Muslim world is not only one kind, comprising super-rich countries and countries with a quasi-democratic regime. However, the general trend is that the Muslim world underperforms in modernity or postmodernity.

Lane & Redissi (2009) assumes that the Muslim civilization may be divided into two worlds: the Arab world and the non-Arab Muslim world. This distinction is not merely based upon the historical emergence of the Muslim civilization over time, but it retains its relevance today, given the ethnic composition of the Muslim population. The Arab world consists of more than 300 million people who speak Arabic and adhere to the Arab culture. It stretches from Morocco in the west to Iraq in the east. Many of its members today live in Western Europe, but there are also Arab minorities in African

countries like Sudan, Somalia, and Mauritania. The Arab world is the origin of the Muslim civilization and has maintained its distinctness

The population of the non-Arab Muslim world is more significant than that of the Arab world. It consists of several ethnicities with different pasts, languages, and cultures. The evolution of the non-Arab Muslim world coincides with the spread of the religion of Mohammed from the Arab peninsula in various directions. Thus, Iran was early included in the Muslim world when many Persians became active in Baghdad as the center of the second of the great caliphates, the Abbasids (750–1258). The Mongol and Turkic peoples entered the Muslim civilization during the medieval period, creating the Mongol Empires and the Ottoman Empire with the conquest of Constantinople in 1453.

Although the Muslims (the Moors) were ejected from Western Europe when Granada fell in 1492, the Muslim world during the high medieval period had started a deep penetration into Asia along several routes. Islam strengthened its grip upon Afghanistan, Mongolia, and parts of Western China. Furthermore, Islam penetrated India, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The traditional tension between the two Muslim worlds, the Arab world, and the non-Arab Muslim world, was heightened by the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the Arab peninsula.

To sum up, the Muslim civilization may be decomposed into the more miniature Arab world and the larger non-Arab world. Typical of both is the retardation of postmodernity. The Muslim civilization is less developed than the other civilizations of the globe, regardless of the measure one employs: affluence, human rights, gender equality, or social development. The Arab world comprises a few wealthy countries, such as the Gulf states. However, their advancement is based upon their being so-called rentier states, where governments extract an immense economic rent from selling oil or gas abroad. It is generally true that the Muslim civilization is less developed economically and politically than the Western or Buddhist civilizations.

1.3.2 Compatibility of Secularism and Islam

The debate regarding the compatibility of Islam and secularism has become increasingly prominent in modern times. Numerous scholars have stressed that within Islam, there can be no distinction between politics and religion, alluding to the concept of an Islamic political system. This evocation elicits a flawed certainty that Islam is a solitary, universal set of ideals in which there is no division between religion, politics, and culture, which generates the notion of a single set of Muslim values that are often opposed to Christian, Secular or Western values (Bostan, 2017). The term secularism is usually defined as the belief that religion should not be involved in the organization of society and education, for example. It is thus due to this view that secularism has often been perceived as antithetical to Islam (Ganji, 2017).

Maududi stresses that Islam is an alternative to the ideological systems of capitalism and socialism and cannot simply exist within them. In Maududi's view, religion is not limited to the private sphere; it is inexorably linked with the public sphere. It is a complete religion that has the solution for all erroneous societies. From Maududi's works, it can be deduced that he did not perceive any distinction between Islam and politics. In light of this, one could argue that Islam and secularism are incompatible. In the Enlightenment period, the church was separated from the state. Thus, religion was arguably limited to the private sphere, playing little part in politics, which is a characteristic that ostensibly typifies secularism.

However, An-Na'im, in *Islam and the Secular State*, argues that the Qur'an never mentions the idea of a state and does not prescribe a particular form of Government. Moreover, during all his life 'the Prophet did not allude to anything that could be called an "Islamic State" or an "Arab state" as he never intended 'to found a political state.' Tibi states, 'historical circumstances imposed on the Prophet the need to act politically,' which shows that the circumstances in which Muhammad did take political actions were due to its contextual necessity, so the unity of religion and politics is not a

constitutive part of Islamic beliefs.' Therefore, the unity of religion and state, viewed as a cardinal principle in modern times by mainstream dogma, is arguably false. As a result, Islam does not have a set methodology for dealing with politics; thus, it could be argued to be compatible with secularism (Bostan, 2017).

Kuru underlined that in 2009, there were 46 countries in the world with a Muslim majority. Kuru also stated that 11 of the countries are Islamic States with Sharia law, 15 countries consider Islam as the states' religion, and the remaining 20 countries are secular (Kuru, 2009). Turkey and Indonesia are both two Muslim majority countries that adopted the idea of secularism. Further, this paper will try to systematically compare the practice of secularism by first determining the brief history, current situation, and challenges.

2. Secularism in Turkey

2.1 Brief History of Secularism in Turkey

The Turkish Republic is the heir to the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman rule lasted for 600 years. It was a multi-ethnic empire with 75 ethnic groups living within its borders. It was also a multi-religious empire with large populations of Muslims, Jews, and Christians of various denominations. Its founders were Muslim Turks, and the empire's administration was semi-theocratic. Although Islamic law was the basis of political rule, this coexisted with the secular decrees of the sultans in administrative matters (Toprak, 2005). Acknowledging the rights of people from different religious backgrounds to share citizenship in the same country was a significant stepping stone toward modern Turkey.

The Ottoman system of administration recognized the multi-religious composition of the population and was accordingly organized around the concept of Millets, or religious communities. Each Millet was subject to its religious law in personal status issues and was given autonomy in its internal affairs concerning the community. This administration system was relatively successful in keeping peace within the empire's borders until the advent of nationalism in the 19th century. Despite these steps of secularization and modernization, the Ottoman Empire was still mainly theocratic in character and outlook. The reason was that the Sultan was officially the head of all Muslims. The first Constitution of the Ottoman Empire, promulgated in 1876, explicitly stated that the primary duty of the Assembly was to carry out the principles of the Sharia. Another article of this Constitution stipulated that the religion of the state was Islam. Further steps to become a secular state were taken decades later.

Following its establishment in 1923, with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the first president, the Turkish assertive secular state has exhibited an almost neurotic fear of religion by insisting on eradicating religion from the public sphere. For Mustafa Kemal and his associates, the role of Islam in Ottoman society and politics was responsible for the failure to modernize. In their view, Islamic teaching and codes of behavior had kept Muslim women outside the public sphere. The ulema (learned men of religion) were vital in opposing all forms of reform and progress in the empire (Toprak, 2005, p. 30). Hence, the new republic would undertake a series of reforms both to emancipate women and to destroy the influence of Islam in education, law, and public administration.

In 1924, the Caliphate and the Ministry of Religious Affairs were abolished. In 1925, religious orders (tarikats) were prohibited. A Civil Code in the Western style was introduced in 1926. 1928, the Constitution was amended, and the article stating that "the state's religion is Islam" was deleted. Finally, the principle of secularism was formally introduced into the Turkish Constitution by the amendment in 1937. Along with these legal changes came many other reforms secularizing social and cultural life. Religious teachings in public schools were suspended. The public demeanor of women was changed, especially in big cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The language of prayers in mosques was changed to Turkish instead of Arabic (Daver, 1988).

Turkey was entering the era of the multi-party system not long after Atatürk was deceased in 1938. During this period, the Republican People's Party, which had started secularism, was still in power. However, under the leadership of President İnönü, several rules regarding secularism were changed after heavy pressure from the newly created Democrat Party. For example, the Republican People's Party had agreed to allow religious instruction in public schools upon the written request of parents. The party also permitted the public to open some religious places, such as türbes. President İnönü's Republican Party also authorized the creation of a Faculty of Theology in Ankara and training imams (religious officials). Such measures and steps were defended as a safeguard against fanaticism and obscurantism (Daver, 1988, p. 33).

In 1950, the Democrat Party was in power and managed to change several rules regarding religion. The Democrats extended the number of institutions to train imams, allowing them to take on a conservative line. In the field of religious instruction in public schools, the Democrats altered this arrangement to allow all Muslim children to receive religious instruction automatically unless their parents requested in writing that their children should not receive such education. Taking another step along the way, the Democrats abolished the law prohibiting using the Arabic form of the call to prayer (ezan). The country immediately dropped the Turkish translation, which the early law had substituted.

The struggle between the principle of secularism and Islam entered another stage with the 26 May 1960 intervention by the army. General Cemal Gürsel and the Commander of the Land Forces sent a letter in May 1960 to the Government through the Ministry of Defence. The letter contains several steps that he thought the Government must take if the political situation was to be righted. According to him, these steps included, among others, ending the exploitation of religion for political purposes. After the coup on 27 May, on many occasions, the members of the military rule shared this view (Daver, 1988, p. 34). Article 2 of the 1961 Constitution solemnly proclaimed, "The Turkish Republic is a national, democratic, secular and social state."

Daver, in his paper about secularism in Turkey, carefully indicates that Atatürk, the most far-reaching secularist, did not openly challenge the Islamic faith, nor did any of the political leaders who came after him. Their struggle was not with the Islamic creed but rather with the superstitions and fanaticism which were borrowed from other faiths, and which finally damaged the religion. As W.C. Smith wrote, "Every honest Turk felt in his deep conscience that those restrictions on clerical and fanatical forces were necessary" (Daver, 1988, p. 36).

On 12 September 1980, another army intervention happened. The main reason given for this new intervention was to establish a solid and healthy democracy. Another reason was to eliminate the destructive forces trying to divide Turkey. It has to be eliminated because they were endangering the very essence of the principles of Atatürk's republic. One of these principles was secularism. Before the 1980 coup, Turkish General Kenan Evren summed up the situation thus: "Everyone speaks of national unity, but unfortunately, everyone fails to bring it about" (Rothman, 2017).

Daver also stated that with the new Constitution of 1982, one can assume that the easing of some more limitations on religious matters may still be expected. These developments certainly aroused much criticism from the leftist parties and progressive circles. However, after the experience of the 1960 and 1980 interventions, the parties in power from now on will be very cautious in handling religious issues. Indeed, they will not give concessions to fanatical and obscurantist circles.

2.2 Recent situation

Turkey's assertive secularism has gradually reconfigured under the stewardship of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) government led by Recep Erdoğan - a politician with an Islamist past. Elected to office in 2002 with 34% of the vote, the AKP's strengthening political clout has unsettled the Kemalist secular establishment. The party's electoral support has grown from 47% in 2007 to 50%

in the 2011 elections. Under the AKP, the Turkish secular state has evolved from the Kemalist assertive secular paradigm towards an inclusive secularism that is reflective of the religiosity of the Turkish public. This evolution of Turkish secularism facilitates a rebridging of state and society while recasting the notion of secularism (Rahim, 2008).

The confinement of religion to the private sphere does not reflect public sentiment in Turkey and is, therefore, unsustainable. For example, surveys indicate that 76% of Turks oppose the ban on the headscarf. The surveys also indicate that 64% of Turkish women wear a headscarf (Yuvuz, 2006). Moreover, Ahmet Kuru predicts that Turkey's deepening democratization will sustain the decline of assertive secularism. Recognizing this likelihood, advocates of assertive secularism have had to rely on the unelected military and judiciary to advance their interests. By contrast, passive secularism is likely to flourish in a political environment that is not only plural but also theologically diverse (Yuvuz, 2006, p. 242).

The AKP is not anti-secular, as alleged by its critics, but maintains an interpretation of secularism that differs from the Kemalist establishment. The critical debate in Turkey then is not whether Turks are for or against secularism but is centered on the struggle for different interpretations of secularism – top-down authoritarian assertive secularism held by the Kemalist establishment versus the bottom-up passive secularism promoted by the AKP and supported by a broad national consensus (Yuvuz, 2006, p. 138). However, recent events in Turkey indicate that the Kemalist establishment may have reverted to its former muscular tactics. Since mid-2011, the political legitimacy of the AKP has been challenged by the mass resignations of the armed forces chief and heads of the army, navy, and air force, unhappy with the ongoing investigations of alleged military plots to oust the AKP government. In 2011, about one-tenth of the army's generals were in custody over an alleged plot presented at an army seminar in 2003 (Al-Jazeera, 2011).

The latest blow to the Turkish military has come due to the failed coup attempt allegedly from a Gulenist section (Tuysuz, 2016). The failed coup has allowed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to go for a wide-scale purge of all the important institutions, including media, police, judiciary, and military (Lowen, 2017). The failed coup and its aftermaths have made the military completely impotent, and therefore, in the future, it will not be able to effectively continue its historical role of protecting secularism.

The diminishing of the military power might have been a good thing. However, as already mentioned, it is taking place in the context of the rise in the Erdogan-led religious populist wave, which is shaking Turkey's secular foundation. Over the years, there have been several moves by the Erdogan-led A.K.P., which have ended up increasing the role of religion in society. Turkey, the poster child country for the argument that a Muslim country can be secular, is now speculated to be in a transition to becoming a conservative religious society (Raja, 2017).

Somer underlined that in recent decades, religious actors have diversified and become more visible and vocal in spiritual as well as social and political realms. These changes are variably attributed to global migration patterns, cultural and technological changes that provide new opportunities for religious groups to mobilize, and the renaissance of religion relative to secular philosophies. In Muslim politics in general and Arab Muslim societies in particular, Islam's social, political, and ideological rise has additional and yet insufficiently understood causes, including the democratic deficits of many Muslim politics and the crises of secular nationalisms and political parties (Somer, 2019). All in all, religious actors of different colors have become important social and political players in many countries, and their views and interests will need to be considered during the establishment and operation of democracy.

In 2007, a Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation survey showed that two-thirds of Turks identified as religious, and only a third identified as secular. A 2015 Pew survey asked respondents in Muslim countries whether they believed Shariah law should be official law. Pew found that only

12 percent of Muslims in Turkey favor this (Bokhari, NA). To understand Turkey today, we have to recognize that Turks, by and large, are proud of their religion (whatever it means to them on an individual basis) and also deeply value the secular principles (if not their precise applications) on which their country was established and has prospered in the last century (Shapiro, NA). This founding could ensure that a rise in right-wing populism in Turkey does not necessarily threaten the future of secularism. However, in the longer run, there is likely to be a move towards an increasingly religiously conservative interpretation of the Constitution and even a gradual scrapping of secularism.

3. Secularism in Indonesia

3.1 Brief History of Indonesia Secularism

After the nation proclaimed its independence in 1945 from three centuries of Dutch occupation and that of the Japanese during World War II, Indonesia experienced three types of Government: liberal democracy, guided democracy, and the New Order. "Liberal democracy" is a term popularized by President Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, and is subsequently used by scholars, writers, commentators, and general people in the Indonesian political community. The period was short-lived, as the constitutional document adopted in 1945 entailed "few well-specified democratic rules of the game" but was only intended to be temporary. In 1950, the Constitution was redrafted to establish a unitary state and a "substantially parliamentary" form of Government. Indonesia experienced its first free national election in 1955, where Islamic and secular parties flourished, though neither could secure a clear majority in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) (Bhakti, 2004).

The period of guided democracy followed liberal democracy and was marked by an emphasis on the executive branch; President Sukarno called this "democracy with leadership" (Bhakti, 2004, p. 198). He invoked the 1945 Constitution, which gave "greater scope for presidential initiative," and took iron control of the nomination processes for the MPR membership. Furthermore, the Government acted through deliberation and consensus rather than voting (Elis, 2007). Sukarno was eventually forced to resign and delegate power to General Suharto, appointed acting president.

With his robust military background, Suharto established the New Order with Pancasila as the state's official ideology. Pancasila came from the Sanskrit words *panca* ("five") and *sila* ("principles"), and it stands as the official philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state. The following comprise the Five Principles:

1. Belief in the one and only God (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*).
2. Just and civilized humanity (*Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab*).
3. The unity of Indonesia (*Persatuan Indonesia*).
4. Democracy is guided by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives (*Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan Dalam Permusyawaratan dan Perwakilan*).
5. Social justice for all the people in Indonesia (*Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia*).

Although Sukarno first established Pancasila, Suharto used Pancasila as the official ideology to suppress all other ideologies and beliefs in Indonesia. Shortly after his appointment, Suharto secured a parliamentary resolution that required all organizations in Indonesia to adopt the secular Pancasila as their basic principles. In effect, all organizations, including political parties, must forego their religious principles in favor of Pancasila. Suharto's "policy of ideological homogenization" resulted in the withdrawal of mass support for political Islam simply because the Government did not allow for any religion to flourish during the New Order.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis was the catalyst for Suharto and the New Order's fall, and political Islam gained momentum with the new opening of democracy in Indonesia. Muslim groups played an essential role in the fall of Suharto and provided an "impetus for the growth of democracy." With the fall of the New Order, "Islamic parties" and "Islam-friendly" secular parties emerged as the policy

of ideological homogenization was dismantled. Increasing demands from the Muslim-majority population to adopt and implement Sharia led, on the one hand, to Islamic parties. Others, attempting to comply with the majority's interests while representing minority groups, form "Islam-friendly" secular parties. Baswedan describes "Islam-friendly" political parties as "parties that do not necessarily adopt Islam as their ideology but that welcome, uphold, and are sensitive to the aspirations" of devout, practicing Muslims. The leaders of these parties come from predominantly pious Muslim backgrounds (Baswedan, 2004).

3.2 Recent Situation

Indonesia's Pancasila model of religion-state relations is worthy of close examination because the country experienced the political convulsions associated with regime change more than ten years before the ongoing 'Arab Spring.' It is also the most populous Muslim-majority country and, according to Freedom House, the most robust democracy in the Muslim World since 2005 remains one of two Muslim-majority countries that has been classified as 'Free.' Indonesia is the third most populous democracy in the world, after India and the U.S. (Dwyer: 2017).

Indonesia's religious-friendly but secular-oriented national ideology, Pancasila, accepts the presence of religion in public life and promotes the belief in God rather than Islam - even though approximately 90% of Indonesians are Muslims. This inclusive secularism was adopted because the country's post-colonial leaders recognized the dangers associated with alienating many Muslims and non-Muslims if Islam and Sharia were to be accorded special status in the fledgling nation-state.

Following the collapse of the authoritarian New Order regime in 1998, conservative Islamists have attempted, on two occasions, to amend Article 29 of the Constitution to make Sharia mandatory for Muslims (Elson, 2010). Not deterred by the lack of success of these proposed constitutional amendments, conservative Islamists have colluded with local politicians to introduce sharia 'through the back door' - via the passage of regional by-laws following the passage of national legislation in 1999 granting greater autonomy to the outer regions primarily to quell secessionist tendencies. Regional by-laws or regulations include the enforcement of compliance with Sharia codes, such as the wearing of the hijab, restrictions on the movement of women in the evening, and the closure of nightclubs. The so-called Pornography Bill, initially sponsored by Islamist parties, was passed in 2008 despite strong opposition from non-Muslims and secular and progressive Muslim organizations.

In Indonesia's Aceh province, the Central Government has facilitated the comprehensive implementation of Sharia primarily to appease the popular separatist movement. The Shariah court system now has primacy over the civil courts. Specific Islamic criminal offenses not found in national laws have been implemented. These include Sharia laws on 'correct belief,' liquor, gambling, and illicit relations. In 2002, the Islamic dress code became mandatory. In the following year, another law was passed allowing for the severe punishment of unmarried couples caught in an intimate act or proximity. The punishment for this breach is whipping - a minimum of three and a maximum of nine lashes.

Since the fall of the regime in 1998, conservative Islamists have had some success in infiltrating mainstream Muslim organizations, promoting sectarianism, and reshaping Muslim attitudes towards Sharia. For example, various surveys undertaken in the last few years suggest that many Indonesians support the mandatory introduction of Sharia, are increasingly intolerant of non-Muslims, and hold intolerant views on non-orthodox interpretations of Islam. However, the numerical growth in Islamist parties since the fall of the New Order regime has not resulted in a concomitant rise in their electoral fortunes (Mujani, 2009).

Leading Islamic scholars who have contributed significantly to the intellectual discourse on 'civil Islam' include Nurcholish Majid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Nurcholish is well known for his pronouncement in the early 1970s that secularism is a liberating process as it allows for re-evaluating

religious thought and practice. He also opposed the establishment of the Islamic State and Islamic parties, seeing them as mere political constructs. Like other progressive reformists, Nurcholish prioritized ethics over political power and saw the Quran as a book of ethical and moral guidance rather than a text dealing with political life's details (Majid, 1998). The former head of the most prominent traditionalist Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (1984-1999), and President of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid, was also a staunch proponent of the Pancasila secular state and religious pluralism.

Many progressive Islamic scholars and Muslim intellectuals remain committed to preserving the spirit of Indonesia's quasi-secular Pancasila state as championed by Nurcholish Majid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Indonesia's vibrant civil society has been active in challenging the attempts of conservative Islamists and opportunistic politicians to expand the jurisdiction of Sharia. Among other things, the advocates of 'civil Islam' have also focused on promoting good governance by scrutinizing government budgets, uncovering corruption scandals, and initiating major political reforms in recognition that good governance is a critical pillar in safeguarding Indonesia's Pancasila secular democracy.

However, the current event may reflect the possibility that Indonesian secularism is threatened. The dramatic growth of orthodox Islamic piety in Indonesia is apparent. Several fine studies have convincingly documented an accelerating process of "Islamization" in Indonesia (Adeney, NA). In early 2017, the governor of Jakarta – the capital of Indonesia – was arrested after being accused of insulting the Quran following the protests of several far-right Islamic organizations. It is fair to describe such a situation as threatening to reshape the country's longstanding secularism, pushes the country farther away from secularism, and more toward an outwardly Islamic identity (Coca, 2016).

4. Conclusion

Muslims are increasingly aware of the multiple forms of secularism, particularly the varieties of secularism that accommodate the presence of religion in the public and political sphere. Moreover, the experience of passive secular democracies in the West and the Muslim World demonstrates that secularisation does not necessarily lead to the erosion of religious belief. Indeed, religious belief and forms of spirituality can and have persisted within the negotiated processes of state secularism.

Secularism has always been considered a fundamental principle in Turkey. The Turkish assertive secular state has exhibited an almost neurotic fear of religion by insisting on eradicating religion from the public sphere. Secularism is often defined as a movement aimed at curbing the supremacy of the Islamic "clergy," which was very strong in political, cultural, and social life. The state still controls religious affairs and organizes them as a department embodied in the general administration. Tension between Islamist and secularist ideology repeatedly occurred in modern Turkey.

Typical of passive secular states, Indonesia does not exhibit a strict separation of religion and state, nor does it have an established religion. Indonesia's Pancasila state is thus not strictly secular or religious. It exhibits a substantial degree of accommodation and inclusion and is described as a "respect all, positive cooperation, principled distance" model. In contrast to the assertive secularism of Kemalist Turkish states, Indonesia's Pancasila passive secularism is more flexible. For example, it has obligatory public holidays for the majority of Muslims as well as minority faiths.

References

- Al Jazeera. (2011, August 1). Turkey to appoint new military leadership. Retrieved December 20, 2017, from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/08/20118113584619619.html>
- Adeney, B. (2017, December 15). Indonesia and the future of Islam. Retrieved December 15, 2017, from <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/indonesia-and-future-islam>
- Bader, V. (2007). *Secularism or democracy?* Amsterdam University Press.

- Baswedan, A. (2004). Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and future trajectory. *Asian Survey*, 44. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.3.401>
- Bhakti, I. N. (2004). *Transition to democracy in Indonesia*. Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies.
- Bokhari, K. (2017, December 16). The Muslim world between Shariah and the rule of law. Retrieved December 16, 2017, from <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-muslim-world-between-shariah-and-the-rule-of-law/>
- Bostan, I. (2017, December 14). Islam, state, and secularism: Assessing the perceived conflicts between Islam and secularism. Retrieved December 14, 2017, from <http://journal.wrocah.ac.uk/article/islam-state-and-secularism-assessing-the-perceived-conflicts-between-islam-and-secularism/>
- Bruce, S. (2009). Secularisation and politics. In J. Haynes (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of religions and politics* (pp. 1-13). Routledge.
- Coca, N. (2016, December 20). Is Indonesia's vaunted secularism under threat? Retrieved December 20, 2017, from <https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/is-indonesias-vaunted-secularism-under-threat/>
- Daver, B. (1988). Secularism in Turkey. *Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi*, IV(11).
- Dwyer, L. (2017, April 20). America's stake in upholding Indonesia's democracy. Retrieved December 20, 2017, from <https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/americas-stake-in-upholding-indonesias-democracy/>
- Ekins, R. (2005). Secular fundamentalism and democracy. *Journal of Markets and Morality*, 8(1), 1-20.
- Ellis, A. (2007). *Indonesia's constitutional change reviewed*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Elson, R. E. (2010). Nationalism, Islam, secularism, and the state in contemporary Indonesia. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 64(3), 1-15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2010.484508>
- Ganji, A. (2017, December 13). Why secularism is compatible with the Quran and Sunnah – and an Islamic state is not. Retrieved December 13, 2017, from https://www.huffingtonpost.com/akbar-ganji/secularism-islam-islamic-state_b_6426300.html
- Hoffe, O. (2007). *Democracy in an age of globalisation*. Springer.
- Kuru, A. T. (2009). A research note on Islam, secularism, and democracy. *Insight Turkey*, 11(4), 1-10. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310901100402>
- Lane, J. E., & Redissi, H. (2009). *Religion and politics*. Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Lowen, M. (2017, December 15). Turkey post-coup purges convulse society. Retrieved December 15, 2017, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37517735>
- Majid, N. (1998). Reinvigorating religious understanding in the Indonesian Muslim community. In C. Kurzman (Ed.), *Liberal Islam: A sourcebook* (pp. 1-20). Oxford University Press.
- Mujani, S., & Liddle, R. W. (2009). Muslim Indonesia's secular democracy. *Asian Survey*, 49(4), 1-20. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2009.49.4.578>
- Nichols, J. (2017, December 14). Benjamin Barber, a brilliant thinker who saw the future. Retrieved December 14, 2017, from <https://www.thenation.com/article/benjamin-barber-a-brilliant-thinker-who-saw-the-future/>
- Pandey, V. C. (2005). *Democracy and education*. Isha Books.
- Rahim, L. Z. (2011). Towards a post-Islamist secular democracy in the Muslim world. Paper presented at the University of Sydney Politics Research Workshop.

- Raja, R. H. (2017, December 20). Turkey's referendum and the future of secularism. Retrieved December 20, 2017, from https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/turkeys-referendum-and-the-future-of-secularism_us_58da76afe4b0ef7ce8c5c1d1
- Ramadhani, F. N. (2023). How Gender Orders and Islamic Influence Affect Women's Participation in Indonesian Politics?. *JILS (Journal of International and Local Studies)*, 7(2), 47-51. <https://doi.org/10.56326/jils.v7i2.2914>
- Rothman, L. (2017, December 14). A short history of modern Turkey military coup. Retrieved December 14, 2017, from <http://time.com/4408850/turkey-coup-history/>
- Shapiro, J. L. (2017, December 13). The blurry line between religion and secularism in Turkey. Retrieved December 13, 2017, from <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-blurry-line-between-religion-and-secularism-in-turkey/>
- Siam-Heng, M. (2010). *State and secularism: Perspective from Asia*. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
- Somer, M. (2009). Democracy (for me): Religious and secular beliefs and social and political pluralism in Turkey. Paper presented at the Sakip Sabanci International Research Award Workshop, Istanbul.
- Stepan, A. (2000). Religion, democracy, and the twin tolerations. *Journal of Democracy*, 11(4), 1-20. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2000.0088>
- Sullivan, M. (2017, December 20). The anti-secularism. Retrieved December 20, 2017, from <http://www.e-ir.info/2016/03/22/the-new-anti-secularism/>
- Toprak, B. (2005). Secularism and Islam: The building of modern Turkey. *Macalester International*, 15(9), 1-20.
- Turner, B. (2011). *Religion and modern society: Citizenship, secularization, and the state*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tuysuz, G. (2016, July 18). Failed coup in Turkey: What you need to know. Retrieved December 21, 2017, from <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/18/middleeast/turkey-failed-coup-explainer/>
- Yuvuz, M. H. (2006). *The emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*. University of Utah Press.