

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST: A CASE OF PALESTINE ISSUE

Noor Fahmi Pramuji¹

¹ auraolivera@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to perform a comparative analysis of Turkey and Indonesia's foreign policy on Palestine Issue. It applies neoclassical realism as one of foreign policy theory. It discusses changing dynamics and influential factors shaping Turkey and Indonesia's Palestine policies at the unit and systemic level of analysis. It summarises that the factors of leaders' perceptions upon international systemic changing trends and pressures, state power have become influential factors. During AK Party's eras in Turkey, its domestic politics has undergone domestic transformations namely public opinion and civil society's roles that influence to the foreign policy, the emergence of civilian leader as a new actor of foreign policy, leader factors, an increase of Islamist factor, the Israel-Palestine conflict perceived as the heart of regional instability resulted in Proactive Foreign policy including in the settlement of Palestine issue. Meanwhile, after reform eras in Indonesia, anti-colonialism spirit of 1945 Constitution has been continued as the historical background of Indonesia's engagement. Besides, an increase of Islamist factor in domestic politics namely Islamist-oriented aspirations in domestic public opinion, muslim groups as a moral force, an increasingly role of Islamist parties, and new Indonesia's international orientation and identity at SBY's tenure have affected a continuity of non-recognition policy towards Israel and supporting Palestine in accordance with two-state solution. As well as Indonesia's democratised foreign policy has been conducted through various diplomatic efforts.

Keywords: *foreign policy, indonesia, neoclassical realism, palestine issue, turkey.*

INTRODUCTION

As the world's Muslim-majority populated countries, Indonesia and Turkey have contributed on the settlement efforts of Muslim world-experienced issues. Both countries are the members and playing role as leading actors in the OIC. In historical context, the Ottoman Empire governed almost of areas that today is called Middle East. Meanwhile, the historical-bond of Indonesia-Middle East had begun in process of Islamist ideas' spreading to Indonesia by Arab people from the Middle East.

Palestine issue is one of the long-lasting issues among Muslim countries. Both countries have been playing various diplomatic efforts on to settle the conflict. According to Bayram Sinkaya (Sinkaya, 2016:21), the Palestine issue in the Middle East could be seen in three dimensions. As the *first*, an Arab-Israeli issue. Almost all of Muslim countries do not recognize sovereignty of Israel and considers "occupied" lands of the Arabs. *Second* is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The conflict includes Palestinian identity living in

"occupied" territories that are mostly in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem since 1967, the ongoing Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem and West Bank, and the massive-constructions of settlement for Israelis that implied to the flee of Palestinian refugees abroad. *Third* is religious conflict, starting after the fell of Jerusalem, one of three Islam's holiest cities under Jewish occupation.

The case of Palestine issue in this paper focuses to the dimension of Palestine-Israeli conflict. The paper aims to perform a comparative analysis of Indonesia and Turkey's foreign policy on the Palestine-Israeli conflict through neoclassical realism theory. It underlines the changing dynamics in Indonesia and Turkey's Palestine policies and examines the influential factors shaping foreign policies at the unit and systemic level of analysis.

The paper limits in both of certain government's countries. The case of Turkey undertakes during the AK Party government. Meanwhile, the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's era in Indonesia. The dramatical

transformations undergoing of those periods become consideration why those are chosen. In particular, since AKP government came to power, Turkey's Middle East policy has transformed significantly compared to the previous decades when the military has a much more influential role. Whereas, the SBY government was marked as the stability stance of Indonesia's democracy after passing the transition eras following the fall of Soeharto government. Since this period, Indonesia has begun a new broader international relations stepping away to turn into Middle East's engagement actively.


METHOD OF RESEARCH

This article is analysed by neoclassical realism theory. It is a foreign policy's theory that studying both structure of international system, domestic factors, and interplay of complex interactions. In understanding how states interpret and respond to external environment, should analyse how systemic pressures are translated by unit level of intervening variables namely foreign policy-makers' perceptions and domestic state power. However, foreign policy-makers are constrained by both international and domestic politics (Rose, 1998:144-172). In other words, foreign policy of states depend on their position in international system as interpretation of state leaders and their relative power or domestic capabilities. For neoclassical realism also idea factor is important particularly when it is performed by powerful individuals (Schweller, 2003). For instance, capability and personality of specific state's leaders directly impact to states' foreign policy.

Neoclassical realism provides three variables such as relative power of states in anarchical international system as independent variable; structure of states (including constraints and motivations), perceptions and evaluations of policy-makers over relative power as intervening variables. And behavior of states as dependent variable (Lobell, 2009). Leaders perceive international events based on historical backgrounds and understandings, the evaluation of relative power and other states' intentions. In addition, state structures include civil society, political coalitions, organizational politics, military-civil relations and the process of bargaining with them as domestic constraints (Ripsman, 2009).

In conclusion, neoclassical realism helps leaders to measure of relations with other states, which impacts the domestic groups have on decision-making process, how

decision-makers assess the international system and power of state while managing the crisis. The basic assumptions of neoclassical realism with its variables shortly is drawn in below graphic as follows:



DISCUSSION

Changing Dynamics of Indonesia and Turkey's Palestine Policy

Indonesia's foreign policy is conducted in accordance with the ideals of Pancasila as a basis of national ideology and manifested into the principles of Independent and Active policy. That principles is a reflection of the Indonesia's 1945 Constitution that is embedded at the first and fourth paragraphs. It points out that Indonesia should pursue peace throughout the world and in case of Palestine-Israeli conflict, Indonesia has engaged to pursue peace as the mandate of Constitution and another factors following behind. Indonesia has still adopt a non-recognition policy towards Israel and supported Palestine in accordance with two-state solution. For further explanation, it will be continued in form of periodical of political regimes in both countries.

1. Indonesia

a. Soekarno Era

In the era of President Soekarno, Indonesia had actively proposed and led to support the independence of Palestine state through Asia-

Africa Conference, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Non-Alignment Movement. Yet, Indonesia's supports in that time was claimed as rhetoric due Indonesia was already in a post-war era and early phase of national development so that it could not able to give the real contributions to Palestine. He conducted the international diplomacy based on the spirit of anti-colonialism and Asia-Africa solidarity. The main pillar of Soekarno's policy was Asia-Africa conference held on April 1955 in Bandung, West Java. The international situation was read by Soekarno as the era of colonialization of big powers and searching for less-power nations to be colonialized. In accordance with his live-principle ideas and background, he proposed anti-colonialism policy in Indonesian foreign policy. Indonesia's self-experienced occupied by foreign nations nearly 300 years as a domestic consideration, resulting in a non-recognition policy of state of Israel. Israel was also perceived as a colonial entity while occupying Palestinians' land.

b. Soeharto Era

Shifting of political power from old order to new order of political regime remained a much more economical and political problems. Indonesia's economic was vulnerable because of global economic crisis. In the aftermath of Soekarno's fell, Soeharto opted to close to the west power particularly U.S to counter Communism ideology-effect. For getting political support of regime survival, developmental foreign assistances and investments mostly from western donors, he proposed "westward" policy and introduced an "open-door policy". However, it was intended to national economic rehabilitation (Perwita, 2007:14).

Indonesia's Middle East policy was limited particularly on engagement to Palestine-Israeli conflict's peaceful efforts. Islamist issue had not been seen in the foreign policy's agenda of Soeharto. It had participated in the OIC since 1972, but it was only as an observer. So, the basic consideration of Soeharto's Middle East policy was not a religious factor. Instead it was seen a much more as a strategic position of Indonesia in international political arena and an attempt to kept the Muslim constituent in order to survival regime.

However, the limited relations was conducted in 1989, Indonesia opened a Palestine Embassy in Jakarta that was marked as a Indonesia-Palestine's approachment. Further, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas revealed that it firmly would never to recognize the state of Israel as long as no-willingness and real actions to recover

relations with Middle East countries (Azra, 2006:102). Unfortunately, in construction of the real diplomatic and supportive's efforts of Indonesia to Palestine was not significantly to foster both countries's bilateral relations.

c. Post-Soeharto/ Transition Era

Following the fell of Soeharto, Indonesia politics led to transtion era from authoritarian to democratic period. Indonesia could be categorised standing on unstable economically and politically during transition eras. In B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati governments because of domestic instability, it was no meaningful diplomatic actions in order to improve Indonesia-Palestine relations.

d. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Era

President SBY had attempted to show a pro-Islam image in foreign policy. In case of Palestine issue, Indonesia supported a democratic elected government based in Gaza, HAMAS that opposition to United States in particular. At the opening of D-8 conference held on June 14, 2006, he put more attention to more improve economic and politic cooperation of Indonesia-Middle East countries. Further, he pointed out Alwi Shihab as a special representative to pursue this diplomatic mission in the Middle East region. During its position as a non-permanent member of Security Council of United Nations in 2007-2008 period, Indonesia actively promoted the right of Palestinians, legitimacy and sovereignty of Palestine state. Eventually it succeeded to convince Security Council to adopted a resolution No.1850 about peace process in the Middle East particularly on Palestine-Israeli conflict. It was first time since 2004 and ratified on December 16, 2008. In the framework of NASSP Plus Conference on Capacity Building Project for PAlestine, Indonesia would train 1000 Palestinians in form of human-capacity building. Indonesia-Palestine agreed to foster relations in the areas of economy, capacity building, diplomacy and politics during 2008-2013 (Deplu, retrieved on Oct.31st, 2017). Besides, Indonesia assisted to built Islamic-based bank, hospital in Gaza as well as humanitarian assistances for Gaza-lived Palestinians.

As a host country, a series of meetings were held in a need to embrace international community's supports. Through a mandate of Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People of United Nations hold United Nations Asian and Pacific Meeting on the Question of Palestine with theme "Strengthening International Consensus on The Urgency of Achieving a Two-State Solution" on June 8-10, 2009, then

a public forum of United Nations Forum of Civil Society in Support of the Palestinian People on May 10, 2009 (Kemlu, retrieved on Oct.31st, 2017).

Since 2011, Indonesia had shown its efforts on statue's improvement of Palestine as a non-member state of United Nations. At the 16th Non-Alligned Movement (NAM) Ministerial Committee was hold in Bali on March 23-27, 2011, Indonesia called for supportive votes on Palestine as a non-member state of United Nations and approved by 112 countries (Embassy of Indonesia, retrieved on Oct.31st, 2017).

At the General Council Meeting of United Nations hold on November 29, 2012 in New York, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa delivered a speech of support and vote for a non-member state of United Nations from initial observer entity with representative of PLO. Indonesia played role as a co-sponsor of resolution. In short, Indonesia's Palestine policy in the era of SBY seemed as an improvement of foreign policy in form of real actions which was never occurred previously. Both officially and unofficially, the real supports and assistances to Palestinians also came from the heart of Indonesia society.

2. Turkey

a. Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) governed Palestine lands for four centuries. In fact, since the Ottoman's victory over the Mamluks in the Marj Dabiq battle of 1516, Turkish-Palestinians relations have been cultivated. The Sultan Ottoman ruled with the principle of religious autonomy for citizens and served in civil services equally (Yazbak, 2014:55). In the 1880s, the influx of Jewish settlers that came in large number and illegally, while intended to construct a national Jewish settlement-separated identity, Sultan opposed. For serving peace and stability in Al-Quds, he employed well established-restrictions on Jewish settlement in the early 1890s. During 1882-1914, the various policies for restriction and prevention of Jewish settlement in Palestine lands and Jerusalem in particular (Republic of Turkey, 2009:17-19).

The new phase of Palestine's history was set after the fell of Ottoman Empire and western allies' victory. As the Sykes-Picot Agreement was approved on February 4, 1916, British started to occupy Palestine for 32 year (1917-1948). The largest territorial portion of the original Palestine mandate was severed in 1922 to form the state of Transjordan. The Palestinian Arabs opposed the Balfour Declaration and the mandate. In conclusion,

since the Ottoman Empire seems that the importance and sensitivity of Al-Quds was lived in the heart of Turks.

b. Prior to AKP Government

Since independence of 1923, Turkish foreign policy's orientation was firmly westward policy (Danfort, p.87). In decades, Turkish Middle East policy was only considered as a west ally. During the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy particularly only more considered the statute and nature of Al-Quds. Besides, it also concerned the "permanent solution" of conflict though Turkey's real actions was not much more active.

Turkish policy-makers had harsh responded to the conflict in various events. For instances, in the building of Jerusalem settlement in East Jerusalem in 1967, the fire of Al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969, and the declaration of Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital under the Basic Law of 1980. Further, since the mid-1960s, Turkey had shown its favours toward Palestinians. For examples, Turkey did not allow U.S. to use the air-base to send aids to Israel in 1967 and 1973. In 1965 to 1992, no Turkish ministers visited Israel. In converse, Turkey allowed PLO to open an office in Ankara in the 1970s. Following that events, the Likud Party of Israel downgraded diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1977 and in the aftermath of 1980 military coup, Turkey also did. In the 1980s was a decade of growing Turkish popular solidarity with Palestinians by all the Turkey's societal segments. In September 1980, National Salvation Party of Turkey launched a mass campaign in Konya titled "Free Al-Quds" against the Israeli annexation policy. Since the Arab-Israeli rapprochement in the early 1990s, Turkish-Israeli relations could develop easily. In aim at managing the conflict, Turkey has established bilateral relations with Israel on various occasions. During the 1990s, Turkey signed several agreements with Israel primarily on economic and military cooperations. The reasons were a strategic calculation of foreign and domestic challenges (Tür, 2012:47). In fact, by Turkey's facilitator role, the PLO and Israel signed the Oslo accords as the part of peace process (Sadrin, 2010:10).

Following the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000, their relations was downgraded. Since the 2000 Intifada, Turkey's sympathy towards Palestinian was already growing. This event was considered as the main stage of a beginning of Turkish policy-makers to respond more vocally in favour of Palestinians.

c. During the AKP Government

1. First Term (2002- 2007)

Since the AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey has built the commitment to provide peace and stability in the Middle East. The AKP government perceives that there is no peace in the region without peace in Palestine. Therefore, in order to establish regional peace, Turkish foreign policy-makers should attempt to settle the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Thus, it has started to intensify the diplomatic involvement of peace process. In short, they view the conflict is the major obstacle to establish permanent peace and promote democracy in region (Aras, 2009:5).

Turkey's active involvement has been considered as a responsibility to build a constructive role in the regional peace process (Yetim, 2014). Turkey stands for the two-state solution. Turkey played as a peace mediator. It still adopts a balancing policy. It strived to play role as a neutral peace mediator as possible. Turkey's priorities such as on the recognition of equal, respect and preservation of the sanctity, recognition of sovereign Palestine state, statute and nature of Al-Quds, and also the empowerment of Palestinians on every level to establish the state of Palestine (ORSAM, 2017:4). But it was no longer since Freedom Flotilla incident occurred.

To playing role as a neutral peace mediator as possible, Turkish attempted to balance relations with both parties and to keep parties' trust. For instance, in 2005 PM Erdogan made a rare visit to Israel met Ariel Sharon. Then, it was followed a balancing visit to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.

In several previously events, Turkey has shown its sensitivity of the conflict. For examples, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit harshly reacted of the Israeli invasion of 2002 stated the Jenin Operation of Israeli as a "Genocide". Foreign Minister Erdogan criticised Israel as a "terror state" in response to the assassination of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin in 2004 and the heavy civilian casualties in the Rafah refugee camp (Onis, 2011:52).

Besides, Turkey has also been proactive to the empowerment and state capacity building for Palestinians. For instances, in 2005, in the framework of Ankara forum, Turkey flourished the economic project through TOBB. Since a lack of progress in Gaza, the focus of forum moved to Jenin in the West Bank. TIKA has undertake various projects in the Palestinian-controlled territories.

2. Second Term (2007-2012)

Following the Israel's Operation Cast Lead to Gaza in 2008, Turkish leaders condemned and the government suspended facilitating role of

Israel-Syria peace talks. In dealing with Gaza situation, Turkey had two-stage strategic plans. First, to broker a ceasefire and provide supervision by international peacekeepers, including Arab-Turkish forces. Second, to achieve a compromise among conflicting Palestinian groups to stabilise Palestinian politics and ensure a commitment to peace.

In international level, by utilising Turkey's two-year terms as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, PM Erdogan welcomed to the Arab League initiative calling for a U.N. Resolution for a ceasefire. Other diplomatic activities conducted Ali Babacan, Minister of Foreign Affairs by attending the extraordinary meeting of OIC's foreign ministers on January 3, 2009. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu also called for immediate international action to end the Israel aggression in Gaza. The final statement of OIC meeting condemned "the ongoing barbaric Israeli assault on the Palestinian people in Gaza" (Benjamin, p.196). In the Global Economic Forum of 2009 of Davos were the stage of Turkey's rising involvement and the radical change occurred. PM Erdogan walked out of the debate and firmly opposed to Israeli President, Shimon Peres in behalf of Israeli's injustice to Palestinians (Barker, 2012:4).

The AKP peace-seeking efforts remained after Israel's Gaza occupation of 2008. In an attempt to open the Israeli's blockade over Gaza, Turkey sent a civil humanitarian aid flotilla. Unfortunately, there was occurred a shoot incident by Israeli force to Freedom Flotilla in May 2010. Further, Turkey-Israeli relations was more halted. Turkey leaders see Hamas as a democratic elected and legitimated Palestinian actor. Thus, it should be included into peace talks. It does not see as a terror organisation as seen by Israel and U.S (World Buletin, retrieved on May 20th, 2017). Furthermore, in various occasions, Turkey toned up over Israeli injustice policies toward Palestinians to the international public.

3. Third Term (2012-2016)

Israel-Turkey normalised diplomatic relations after six years of Freedom Flotilla incident under Turkey provision of Israel with Israel paying compensation to Freedom Flotilla victim's families and allowing Turkey to carry out the humanitarian projects for Palestinians in Gaza (Independent Turkey, retrieved on May 20th, 2017).

Turkey's involvement reached at the level complexity which includes the intervention of regional alliances, diplomacy vis a vis with the U.S. and the E.U due Turkey proposes to include Hamas in the Palestinian political and

peace process. Its aim is to persuade Hamas to declare the ceasefire and work for the political accommodation of different groups within Palestinian politics. Pursuing the Palestinian political stability in order to step forward of the peace process. Turkey has already started to mediate Hamas and international actors while maintaining regular contacts with Fatah, the Palestinian Authority, U.S. and EU countries.

In the first annual conference of the Association of Parliamentarians for Al-Quds, held in Istanbul, President Erdogan called on all Muslims actively embraces the Palestinian issue and protect Al-Quds. He also asserted "a lasting peace in the Middle East can not be reached without a free Palestine based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital." He also voiced for fighting over the holy status of Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, following the Israeli government proposed a ban on the Islamic call to prayer in the Jerusalem (Daily Sabah, retrieved on May 19, 2017).

However, in recent years, a series of regional crisis (the refugee crisis, ongoing war against ISIS, and the failed state problems of Syrian and Iraq), Turkish efforts to settle conflict also challenged. Those have affected directly to national security, created instability and insecurity in the region. Besides, PKK terror attacks and the July 15 coup attempt have been challenging the capacity of the AKP to govern and provide national security. Therefore, those have delimited Turkish engagement and involvement in the Middle East (Keyman, 2017:60). Following the crisis resulted of Arab Spring (ISIS, failed states, the refugee influx, etc) impacted Turkish proactive foreign policy immensely.

In last two years, the present nature of Turkish proactivity seems to be more selective, focused, globally limited. Today, the regional and global engagements including Turkey is a much more concern to Syria and Iraq, in Africa as well, and operate on the basis of security priorities. Another factor that also influences to Turkish role as a peace mediator is up-down of Turkish-Israel relations. Turkish-Israel had a much more deteriorated. Though rapprochement was conducted in 2016 with pointing out new ambassador of both countries, political relations, in particular, has remained halt. In short, Turkish peace mediating role further is not much more intensive than initial periods.

During three terms of the AKP government emphasises some critical points concerning the conflict as follows. First, the importance of Jerusalem (Al-Quds). Second, the settlement

issue. Third, Solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will contribute to regional peace and stability or all regional conflicts basically. Fourth, concerning the Arab Peace Initiative calls for ending of Israel's occupation of Arab territory in return for peace with the Arab world. It results in a recognition and normalised relations with the Arab world in particular and Muslim world in general. Fifth, Turkey asserts the two-state solution of the 1967 borders. Sixth, Turkey emphasises that Hamas should be included in peace talks as a legitimate actor in Palestinian domestic politics.

Influential Factors Shaping Indonesia and Turkey's Policy on Palestine Issue: A Neoclassical Realism Analysis

1. Indonesia

a. Anti-Colonialism Spirit of 1945 Constitution

Since the era of Soekarno, Indonesia has conducted foreign policy towards Palestine as a mandate of 1945 Constitution with anti-colonialism spirit. The fundamental conception of Indonesian foreign policy refers to the 1945 Constitution that is manifested at the fourth paragraph that containing the principles of Active and Independent. Independent means Indonesia should not involve in any foreign military alliance or security pact. It is firmly reveals that nationalism nature of Indonesia and refuse to engage and depend on foreign powers in order to prevent foreign intervention and serve for sovereignty. Active explains that Indonesia should fight in any sense of occupation in the world and pursue the world peace (Hatta, 2001:469).

In implementation of principle of Active foreign policy, Indonesia supports to the independence of Palestine state. A spirit of anti-colonialism is embedded in 1945 Constitution at first paragraph. So, Indonesia has strongly commit to fight on any sense occupation in the world (Anwar, 1998). It is reflected frequently support to Palestine issue as an importance agenda of foreign policy in particular since the era of SBY that seems to contribute in the real actions.

b. An Increase of Islamist Factors in Domestic Politics

The factor of an increase of Islamist in domestic politics is described in form of the existent of Islamist-oriented aspirations of domestic public opinion, the emergence of Muslim groups as the moral force, and an increasingly role of Islamist parties.

Indonesia is inevitable for the inclusion of Islamist factor into the foreign policy's

consideration. In terms of foreign policy formulation and implementation, Islam is considered as a societal factor within state. Indonesia government never claimed officially that its relations with Muslim issues in behalf on Islam or religious considerations. In fact, participations either in relations with Muslim world's issues or in response to Middle East conflicts, eventhough Islam as a societal and political factor is not considered as political ideology factor, it influences its foreign policy.

Domestically, Islam is paramount of social and political factors in shaping the Muslim political and social movements. Therefore, it embedded in Indonesia's foreign policy. In case of Palestine issue, particularly in dealing relations with Israel, Indonesia recognises the influence of Islamist factors and Islamist forces prevalent in the country.

Analysing the increase of Islamist factor as a determinant factor in Indonesia's relations with Muslim world by exploring the existence of domestic forces influencing foreign policy. In case of Indonesia's domestic politics is formed by Muslim community and Islamist parties (political movements) as the representatives of majority population.

As the beginning of independence, officially Indonesia's foreign policy set Pancasila as national ideology. Since Pancasila is believed as the middle way and a compromise among inter-faith religion in Indonesia. National leaders putting the basic of Indonesia's active and independent foreign policy principles, had not mentioned firmly a certain religion driving the orientation and objective of foreign policy (Arora, 1981:273-292). However, Indonesia respects to Islamic values and success to bring the Islamist, modernism, and democracy especially in era of SBY government.

In the aftermath of Soeharto's fell, domestic political conjuncture has been turn to a more democratic. It has opened a much more opportunity for Islamist parties and Muslim groups to participate in domestic political arenas. They have started to play a influential role to influence decision-making process and foreign policy.

In case of Indonesian Palestine policy, since independence, Indonesia has adopted a continuous of non-recognition policy towards Israel, as a form of solidarity to Palestinians officially. When President Wahid was intend to open diplomatic relations of Indonesia-Israel, domestic public opinion that was constructed of majority Muslim people harsly responded with a refusal of Muslim groups including the moderat Muslim groups represented by Nahdatul Ulama and

Muhammadiyah as well as extremist Muslim groups. Because of getting a strong pressures of Muslim groups, Islamist parties, and the Council of Indonesian Ulama eventually the government canceled its intention (Panggabean, 2004:33). This case indicates the influential roles of Islamist parties and Muslim civil society groups as the moral force or pressure group in influencing decision-making of foreign policy and playing a critical role in the conjuncture of domestic politics.

President SBY reveled that Indonesia was ready to be a mediator of conflict. This was considered as an attempt of leading initiative embracing Islamist aspect, a clear aside of solidarity to Muslim world, and an anomali position to intial government's periods. However, it was self-proclaimed by some political observers on Indonesian foreign policy such as Greg Fealy (Fealy, 2006:26) stated that such policy was reflected in context of domestic political perspective as a strategy of serving Muslim constituents of its coalition government. Since the general election of 2004, the Democratic Party only reached 5% voters and in a need of supports of Islamist parties such as PKS, PPP, and PBB.

Indonesia has no diplomatic relations with Israel officially, so that its effort to be a peace mediator without the real political vehicle was likely unconsiderable. Eventually Islamist agenda is not be able yet as a essential component of Indonesia's foreign policy. However, compared to initial periods, Indonesia has shown the real contribution to Palestine issue and attempted to embrace the Islamist-oriented aspirations of domestic public opinion that got a much more limited response in Soeharto government.

c. Shifting to A New International Orientation and Identity

Shifting to a more democratic in Indonesia domestic politcs has impacted to emerged a democratised foreign policy. At the first official speech of orientation of Indonesian foreign policy in the meeting of Indonesian Council on World Affairs on May 19, 2005 in Jakarta, President SBY mentioned clearly a new national identity of Indonesia. He pointed out that Indonesia as a home of world's largest Muslim population where Islam, democracy and modernity running altogether (Yudhoyono, 2005:124-125).

It was mainly marked as a turning point of a new orientation and identity of Indonesia's Muslim world policy. President SBY intended to reflect Indonesia a Muslim-moderate country in which bridging Islamic world and the west. Indonesia has Pancasila as a national ideology which plays as a foreign diplomatic

tool bridging inter-faith religion dialogue. Compared to the initial long periods (particularly in the era of Soeharto) was limited to engage in the Muslim world's issues especially in Palestine-Israeli conflict.

Indonesia set clearly the orientation of foreign policy to commit actively in Muslim world especially in settlement of conflict in the Middle East since the SBY government. The government institutionally and regionally toned up the supportive actions on Palestine issue. Altogether, the Muslim groups intensively shown the solidarity to Palestinians especially post-Israel's Gaza invasion of 2008 and 2014.

Since shifting to a new foreign policy's orientation, Indonesia government and legislative council have significantly contributed to the effort of Palestine's independence in various diplomatic actions as follow establishing Kaukus parliament for Palestine, condemning to political intern-crisis, releasing petitions to free Palestinian legislative members of Israel's detention, raising public funding for Palestinian, building Indonesian hospital in North Gaza, sending volunteers and public rallies for the independence of Palestine, Indonesian representative of United Nations calling for stop over Gaza's blockade, firming the rights of Palestinian to get turn into homeland, Palestine national's rights for preventing and serving of Al-Aqsa mosque, condemning the Israel unjust policy over Palestinians.

Indonesia's successful diplomatic actions for Palestinians in the level international parliament as follow supposing Palestine as a member of Inter-Parliamentarian Union, as a APA President Standing Committee on Political Standing Committee and Vice President PUIC (Parliamentary Union of the OIC Member States) 2010-2012 held "APA Troika Meeting" for addressing the conflict on May 31, 2010.

Indonesia always commits to consistently standing for freedom of Palestine over occupation, supporting a democratic government in Palestine, fully supports on reconciliation process in Palestine's domestic politics, proposing ASEAN member countries as well as the members of Non-Alignment Movement to recognise Palestine state.

2. Turkey

a. The Role of Public Opinion and Civil Society Influencing Foreign Policy

Since the AKP came to power, military has no longer the influential role and as a determinant factor of foreign and domestic policy. Instead domestic public opinion increasingly determines. In order to support the

achievement of Turkish foreign policy, the AKP government has established state and non-state institutions as the public diplomacy tools of Turkish soft power (Cevik and Philip, 2015:6).

Beyond state institutions, non-state actors namely NGOs emerged and get involved in succeeding of foreign policy's objectives. The importance's rise of non-state actor, the existent of NGOs also should be accounted. They play role and establish cooperations with both state and non-state actors. Civil society such NGO and think-tanks institutions plays on critical roles including as the peace mediator actor and serving as pressure groups into state's decision-making process particularly in the implementation phase. Civil society also influences to decision-making process for instances as adviser of governmental agency, conducting a series of policy-oriented academic research, and facilitate dialogue through international cooperations such as foreign think-tanks (Sancar, 2015:28). The opinion leaders, has also impacted by taking parts in citizen diplomacy initiatives, promoting global causes, raising awareness to a certain political issue.

In case of Palestine, industrial community namely TOBB's reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in the Erez Industrial Area of Northern Gaza Strip and Jenin of West Bank. ORSAM, a Turkish think-tank which focuses to the Middle East-oriented researches, has contributed to advice the government in context of Turkish's Middle East policy including policy toward Palestine. IHH, a Turkish NGO, initiated the Freedom Gaza Flotilla that also embraced other states' humanitarian activists altogether brought aids to Gaza in response of Israel's siege of Gaza. In the AKP government, domestic public opinion increasingly has emerged as a determinant factor shaping foreign policy (Kanat, 2014:74). In the same line, foreign issue has also appeared as a main instrument influencing domestic public opinion. In case of the Palestine-Israeli conflict, re-emergence of common historical and cultural sense under Ottoman heritages in domestic public opinion have reshaped Turkish Middle East's engagement as a political reality and in settlement's efforts.

In fact, the Palestine issue is a sensitive issue in Turkish society for long decades. It also gains a large majority sympathy among the various groups of Turkish society that touches the heart. The main subject of Palestine issue for most of Turks is the status of holy place Al-Quds and who will control (Aras,

2003:49). Turkish favours to Palestinians also came from a large segments of Turkish society that accumulated into domestic supportive public opinion. For instance, an anti-Israel sentiment emerging as a hard response of Turkish public opinion and domestic politics to Gaza tragedy of 2008 resulted in a cancelation policy of the joint military exercise and agreement with Israel (Balci and Kardas, 2012:115) and as a political attitude of Turkish leader, PM Erdogan walked out of the Davos meeting in 2009. Those draw that domestic public opinion has influenced foreign decision, decision-maker's action and attitude in response to Israel invasion to Gaza.

b. The Emergence of Civilian Leader as A New Actor of Foreign Policy

A significant transformation in Turkish domestic politics compared to governments before the AKP government is the emergence of active civilian leadership and democratically elected officials. It gives a gain of an active civilian control over military in decision-making mechanism. It also affects to attempt of stabilising the domestic political structure in which the current decision-making process conducted by multi-actors (IGOs, NGOs, think tanks, etc). Those have become as new tool of Turkish soft power.

During the AKP government, Turkey seems trying to rebuild the domestic political structure especially in decision-making mechanism through slowly undermining the overwhelmingly military influence in Turkish domestic and foreign policy. Instead the emergence of multi-actor cultivating decision-making process. They raised to be a determinant decision-maker and the most important actor in national security and foreign policy.

For long years under military influences, it was tend to adopted the isolation policy that was mainly concern to domestic security, westward policy, and had "limited" relations with Middle East countries. It was altered as the transformation occured bringing the emergence of civilian leaderships. They seem to embrace the domestic public opinion including to actively engage into peace process of the conflict. The rise of civilian leadership consequently attracting international public opinion to pay attention to their policy and attitude, instead the official statement of Turkish military leader. So that, civil leaders also have been motivated to contribute and show their capacity to settle the conflict to international community particularly to the Palestine-Israeli conflict.

c. Leader Factors

At his tenure as Foreign Minister, Davutoglu pointed out that the Arab-Turkey rapprochement is a natural historical return. It is a continuation of Ottoman long history in the Middle East. He added that it makes Turki so possible to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the conflict has been and still is the main axis of regional security and Turkey will care for region's details (Mujani and Ahmed, 2015:556). Turkish leaders also consider that no permanent peace can be found in the region without seeking solutions on the long decade's problems between Palestinian and Israeli. They already did not perceive its surrounded by unfriendly countries. Prior to Ozal administration, Turkish foreign policy was guided by the principle of "Peace at Home, Peace Abroad", adopted isolationism (Perthes, 2010:2). Further, they realised the strategic importance of Muslim world and Turkey need to re-engage on this world. This understanding contributed of Turkish Middle East's engagement.

The AKP with the identity of democratic-conservative perceives the Israel-Palestinian conflict in two dimensions. First, the conflict is a long decades conflict both in regional level and Muslim world particularly the status of Jerusalem (Al-Quds) and the Al-Aqsa mosque as a holy place for Muslim people. Second is Turkish-Israel relations. During the AKP rule, those relations are up and down. Even in order to settle the conflict, Turkey has taken risks in its relations with America and European countries. In the context of pursuing the permanent solution and the current real compromise solution for both parties is two-state solution of the 1967 borders.

In addition, Turkey proposes and emphasises to involve all parties including Hamas in peace talk. In consideration of Palestine politics' stability (with reconciliation of Hamas-Fatah faction) as a step forward of the peace process. Since Hamas is democratically elected government in Parliament election of Gaza strip since 2006.

d. An Increase of Islamist Factor

The AK Party underlines itself a conservative-democratic party which respecting Islamic values, has brought successively Islam, secularism and democracy. In the same time involving Islamist groups into the political arena, in shaping Turkish national and foreign policy in order to serve a democratic equality for all parties of country. Those lead to the increasing role of Islamists in domestic politics.

The existence of civil society such as NGOs with a predominantly Islamist outlook has also been contributing to shape foreign policy. Their role might be considered as a political pressure group of decision makers in regard to Palestine issue. Since they might be perceived in regard to their strategic value's consideration as the AK Party's core conservative constituency. Their aspirations of Palestine issue have might be contributing to drive leader's perception and decision to engage in conflict's settlement. It also considers the sensitivity of Jerusalem status and nature as a holy city for all Muslim including in Turkish society for long years. It could be seen at the AKP leaders harshly reacted in any attempt of settlement buildings for Israeli in and around the holy city of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) as well as Israeli's unfair policies over Arab Palestinians.

e. Proactive Foreign Policy

In the end of the Cold war, Turkish foreign policy became more active in the Middle East. In the period of 2002-2010, Davutoglu's concept of "Strategic Depth", and his understanding of civilization mostly defined the basic parameters of Turkish foreign policy. It develops on the historical and geographical depth. Turkey should establish and provide security and stability in the region as its historical responsibility. Besides, it realised the strategic importance of region, so that it should engage to the region.

The AKP government has built commitment to provide peace and stability in the region. So that, Turkey has undergone a proactive foreign policy. By this foreign policy choice, Turkey should play an active role as a mediator, facilitator, etc including to settle the regional conflicts. Since they consider that no lasting regional peace without finding the permanent solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkey has engaged and get involved actively in the peace process.

Turkey's proactive foreign policy represents its vision, identity and strategy. Among of Turkey's visions are to establish Turkey as an influential regional actor and a peaceful regional order (Minitistry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Turkey, retrieved on Oct.30th, 2017). Thus, its foreign policy choice has represented an attempt of establishing peace and stability in the region. Turkey plays a role as the peace mediator including settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkey should emphasise on dialogue and negotiation to settle the disputes and the adoption of a win-win approach (Carley, 1995:20).

CONCLUSION

Turkey and Indonesia have conducted not only in various diplomatic efforts but also an active contributions of civil societies to settle the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Both countries stand for *the two-state solution* based on the borders of 1967. In dealing with Israel, Turkey has adopted the balancing policy in order to serve and succeed the role as mediator peace of the conflict. Whereas Indonesia still stands for a continuity of non-recognition policy towards the state of Israel.

Both leaders's perceptions to the dynamics of international relations influencing to the decision-making process and what foreign decision they opt. However, the existent of domestic constraint variables such as civil society, political coalitions, organizational politics, pressure groups and military-civil relations of both countries as well as state's domestic motivations intervene the leaders' behaviour and decision, decision-making process.

Since the AKP came to power, Turkey has undergone the significant transformations in domestic politics influencing Turkish' Palestine policy. Those are public opinion and civil society's roles influencing foreign policy, the emergence of civilian leader as a new actor of foreign policy, leader factors, an increase of Islamist factors, the Israel-Palestine conflict perceived as the heart of regional instability resulted in Proactive Foreign policy including the settlement of Palestine issue.

Meanwhile, in the SBY government of Indonesia, anti-colonialism spirit of 1945 Constitution has been continued as the historical background of Indonesia's engagement. Besides, an increase of Islamic factor in domestic politics namely Islamic oriented aspirations in domestic public opinion, Muslim groups as the moral force, an increasingly roles of Islamic parties, and new Indonesia's international orientation and identity as well as Indonesia's democratised foreign policy.

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